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and reconnaissance). The authors
make a case that throwing everything,
including the kitchen sink, into the
rubric of network-centric-warfare
systems has failed to deliver the payoffs
promised. Instead, it is time to simplify
the complexity; Cares and Cowden
stress that only two core detection
functions—search and surveillance—matter for operational-level
naval warfare, and they explain why.
In their conclusion, the authors offer
three salient recommendations to
advance the operational art applicable to modern fleet combat:
1. Inaugurate a new golden age. Invest
directly in elevating modern naval
thought. Ultimately, the management of power and the fighting of
wars are contests of ideas, and to
stay ahead you need the best ideas.
2. Play to learn how to win. Subject
new ideas to vigorous wargaming
efforts through competitive, stressful play. Test, test, and retest to
figure out which ideas work best.
3. Take the new golden age to sea.
Even detailed plans fall apart once
you make contact with the enemy.
Practice how you expect to fight:
out on the water, in the open sea.
Fighting the Fleet is a call to reinvigorate
the study of combat theory. It applies
not so much from the perspective of grand strategy as from the
practical realization that to dominate
the sea, leaders of a modern navy
must master the operational art.
While the authors infuse a healthy
dose of systems theory and warfighter
calculations (salvo theory and the like)
into this brief work, do not let that
dissuade you from absorbing the book’s
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valuable lessons. Even a ground pounder
like me understands that victory at
sea is still a product of experienced,
effective leadership. All naval leaders
need to understand the fundamentals
presented in Fighting the Fleet.
SCOTT F. PARADIS

Anson’s Navy: Building a Fleet for Empire, 1744 to
1763, by Brian Lavery. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2022. 288 pages. $70.

When thinking of Britain’s Royal
Navy (RN) during the age of sail, one
usually is drawn to events of the turn
of the eighteenth to the nineteenth
century: great victories such as
those of the Glorious First of June
(1794), Camperdown (1797), the Nile
(1798), and Trafalgar (1805), with
Horatio Nelson reigning supreme.
However, the Royal Navy of the earlier
eighteenth century was far less capable
and organized than it would be by the
end of the Napoleonic Wars. Despite
the laurels won during the Anglo-Dutch
Wars of the 1600s and the War of the
Spanish Succession from 1701 to 1714,
the Royal Navy was woefully ill prepared
to fight the new conflicts that sprang
up starting at the end of the 1730s. Not
only did its naval tactics and leadership
require reform, but several new warship
types were needed to fight and win
actions conducted in waters increasingly distant from Europe. Crucially, the
Royal Navy rose to the myriad challenges
facing it from 1744 to 1763—years in
which the service, according to author
Brian Lavery, “was reformed and made
fit for purpose to fight even more intense
conflicts at the end of the century and
the beginning of the next” (p. 6).

1

182

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 75 [2022], No. 2, Art. 17

Lavery is one of Great Britain’s most
prominent naval historians, having
published over thirty books on British
naval history from the age of sail to the
modern day. Like his previous books Nelson’s Navy: The Ships, Men, and Organisation, 1793–1815 (1989) and Churchill’s
Navy: The Ships, Men and Organisation,
1939–1945 (2006), Anson’s Navy covers
a distinct period in RN history. It was
Lavery’s goal to produce a synthesis of
past writing from Sir Herbert Richmond,
Sir Julian Corbett, and others with morerecent research. Scholars will appreciate
the extensive bibliography encompassing several centuries of primary and
secondary sources, while the book’s easy
readability will give the layperson a solid
introduction to the period in question.
While never intended to be an encyclopedic work, Anson’s Navy offers much that
is relevant to modern-day navalists. An
obvious parallel is that found between
the Royal Navy’s development of thirtytwo-gun frigates by following French
privateer designs and the U.S. Navy’s recent adaptation of its Constellation-class
frigate from the Franco-Italian multipurpose frigate (referred to as the FREMM).
In February 1744, the Royal Navy
suffered a humiliating strategic defeat off
Toulon, effectively shifting control of the
Mediterranean to Spain and France. The
senior British officers present, Admirals
Mathews and Lestock, vociferously
blamed each other for the failure; in
the public investigations and spate of
courts-martial that followed, Mathews
and seven ship captains present at
Toulon were dismissed from the service.
By contrast, on 15 June 1744, Captain
George Anson, commanding HMS
Centurion, returned from a cruise
around the world that had lasted
almost four years. Despite its various
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serious costs, Anson’s circumnavigation
was hailed as a resounding triumph.
Its crowning achievement was the
capture of a Spanish treasure ship in
the Pacific Ocean, from which every
(surviving) able seaman came away with
approximately twenty years’ wages in
prize money. Anson promptly ascended
to the Admiralty, and, following his
victorious command at the first battle of
Finisterre in May 1747, he was ennobled
as the first Baron Anson. He served as
First Lord of the Admiralty from 1751
to 1756 and again from 1757 to 1762.
Anson’s Navy describes the transformative period in the middle of the
eighteenth century during which, Lavery
contends, the stage was set for the Royal
Navy to achieve its later dominance in
the Napoleonic Wars. Through thirteen
chapters, Lavery gives attention to a
multitude of factors that affected the
development of the Royal Navy: the
workings of Parliament and the British
cabinet, cooperation and competition
between the Admiralty and navy boards,
the state of British colonies worldwide,
and (naturally) the ships and men
of the service itself. Lavery skillfully
weaves these factors into a coherent and
digestible whole; the reader need not
fear being bogged down by minutiae.
Despite his long tenure at the Admiralty,
Lord Anson detested the constant political
wrangling of the British government,
yet he often got his way by cannily
circumventing regulations and actively
avoiding the attention of Parliament (p.
14). In this fashion he pushed through
the development of seventy-four-gun warships and true frigates, the appointment
of favored candidates as naval surveyors
and master shipwrights, and the rise to
prominence of several veteran officers
of the circumnavigation. By the end,
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despite an inauspicious beginning and
the subsequent controversial execution
of Admiral John Byng (and the end
of Anson’s initial term as First Lord),
the Royal Navy had reinvented itself
successfully under fire, becoming the
dominant naval force in Europe by the
end of the Seven Years’ War (1763).
Lord Anson did not take office with
specific reforms in mind; instead he
repeatedly responded to demonstrated
deficiencies in the Royal Navy. On the
other hand, he left for the attentions
of future First Lords such as Sandwich
and St. Vincent the reform of the
royal dockyards. With the establishment of the Impress Service, Anson’s
administration made the practice of
impressment more efficient, though not
more palatable to British mariners.
Lavery’s work compellingly illustrates
how the Royal Navy under Anson’s
leadership took the first critical steps
needed to face a resurgent France at
the turn of the nineteenth century
and to ensure that Britannia would
continue to rule the waves.
MICHAEL ROMERO

George C. Marshall and the Early Cold War:
Policy, Politics, and Society, ed. William A. Taylor. Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 2020. 310
pages. $29.95.

Almost everyone reading this journal
knows that George C. Marshall is
one of the most important figures in
the history of the national security
of the United States. His role as U.S.
Army Chief of Staff dominates the
historical literature, but his achievements as Secretary of State and
Secretary of Defense also were huge.
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It was to study these later achievements
that William A. Taylor assembled this
anthology, which focuses on Marshall’s
record during the early portion of the
Cold War. Since a variety of authors
are involved in these types of projects,
there is always a range in the quality
of the contributions. The authors of
the various chapters are a diverse mix,
ranging from junior assistant professors
to emeriti, but the bulk seem to be at
the junior associate level. It is a credit
to Taylor’s editorial and administrative
skills that the variance in the quality
of the offerings is rather small.
The topics the authors explore include
universal military training, the effort to
mediate the Chinese civil war, the creation of an independent U.S. Air Force,
the National Security Act of 1947, the
role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy,
the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, the Korean War,
and the racial integration of the armed
forces. While Marshall was a major
player in affairs of state for the whole
period between 1939 and 1951, his presence throughout was less than total; for
instance, despite the authors’ assertions
in the chapters on the National Security
Act of 1947 and the desegregation of the
military, he barely played a role in those
evolutions. Some of the material is hardly
new; the chapters on the Marshall Plan
and nuclear weapons are short versions
of the authors’ books on the same topics.
Like all editors of books of this type,
Taylor ties all the essays together in an
introduction and a conclusion. These
sections in anthologies often are not
that useful, but Taylor makes some
solid points in his conclusion about
the importance of tying defense and
foreign policies to social values, and also
regarding the importance of alliances
and how to make them stronger.
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